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INTRODUCTION
This is the fourth report of the Subcommittee on International
Law and Relations ("Subcommittee") of the Advisory Committee
*

The San Diego Law Review is pleased to provide a forum for the

publication of the Subcommittee on International Law and Relations
Report on 1976 New York sessions of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. The Report is denominated an Afterword only
because the press of events precluded the publication of the Report with
the papers in the articles section of the Review.
* * This is the fourth report of the Subcommittee on International Law
and Relations of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea. The
Committee, established in 1972, is composed of private citizens appointed
by the Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force
on the Law of the Sea to "provide adequate representation of the diverse
interests involved in the law of the sea." Members of the Committee
serve solely in an advisory capacity. This informational report has been
prepared by the Rapporteur of the Subcommittee, John Temple Swing,
Esq. The views stated herein do not necessarily represent those of the
United States Government or of the subcommittee as a whole.
* **
Robert B. Krueger, Los Angeles, California, Chairman; John Temple
Swing, New York, New York, Rapporteur; Lewis Alexander, Kingston,
Rhode Island; R. R. Baxter, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Jonathan I. Charney,
Nashville, Tennessee; Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Coral Gables, Florida; Richard
Copaken, Washington, D.C.; Aaron Danzig, New York, New York; Arthur
H. Dean, New York, New York; Margaret L. Dickey, Washington, D.C.;
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on the Law of the Sea with respect to pending negotiations on Law
of the Sea and particularly the Third United Nations Conference
on Law of the Sea ("Conference"). The first report consisted of
recommendations for research prior to the first substantive session
of the Conference. The second report consisted of an account and
analysis of the proceedings at the Caracas session of the Conference
together with a recommendation for inter-sessional research. The
third report contained a general discussion of organizational procedural aspects of the Geneva session and an analysis of the outcome
with particular reference to the "informal Single Negotiating Text."
It concluded with some recommendations for future inter-sessional
research.
The present report briefly reviews the work of the principal Conference committees at the third and fourth substantive sessions of
the Conference held in New York from March 14 through May 7,
and from August 2 through September 17, 1976, respectively; continues with a discussion of dispute settlement and a brief report
on the present status of the Revised Single Negotiating Texts at
the end of the second New York session and concludes with a
summary outlining some of the more difficult problems that will
be before the Conference when it resumes in its fifth substantive
session in New York in May, 1977.
REPORT ON COMMITTEE

I

The single most difficult question before the entire Conference
in general and Committee I in particular has been the question:
Who shall exploit the mineral resources of the deep ocean (the
"common heritage" area) and under what circumstances? From
the outset the developed world, with the United States in the fore,
has stressed the need for guaranteed access, security of tenure and
sanctity of contract as essential ingredients of any treaty. On the
other hand, the developing countries, led by the Group of 77 (now
more than 100 developing countries), and with clear resonance to
arguments made by that group in its pursuit of a "new economic
order," have consistently sought a monopolistic seabed authority
Richard N. Gardner, New York, New York; Louis Henkin, New York,
New York; Dr. Ann Hollick, Washington, D.C.; Philip C. Jessup, Norfolk,
Connecticut; H. Gary Knight, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; John G. Laylin,
Washington, D.C.; Myres McDougal, New Haven, Connecticut; Benjamin
Read, Washington, D.C.; Charles S. Rhyne, Washington, D.C.; Dean Rusk,
Athens, Georgia; Louis B. Sohn, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

with jurisdiction both over production and marketing so constructed
procedurally as to give the developing countries clear control over
its key organs.
The difficulty of constructing a compromise between what in
essence is a conflict between two sharply differing philosophies can
be seen by making a comparison between the text developed in
Committee I with those produced by Committees II and III. By
the end of the second substantive session of the Conference held
in Geneva in the spring of 1975, informal Single Negotiating Texts
were prepared by the chairmen of each of the three principal committees. While all three texts were in theory based on the opinion
of the respective chairmen, in Committees II and III, many of the
draft articles reflected weeks of hard negotiation and proposed solutions around which a substantial consensus might be expected to
coalesce. Thus, even in their initial form, both the Committee
II and III texts provided the framework from which the final treaty
itself might ultimately emerge.
Such, however, has not been the case in Committee I. In Geneva,
even the tentative efforts to come forward with provisions that
sought the beginnings of compromise between the two positions
painfully negotiated in the working group chaired by Christopher
Pinto were overturned at the last minute in important respects by
Chairman Paul Engo whose informal Single Negotiating Text tilted
sharply toward accommodation of the views of the Group of 77.
As such, the Engo text was largely unacceptable to the major
industrial countries.
During the Geneva session, if there was any single rallying point
for the Group of 77, it was the need to protect developing landbased producers from the alleged threat of economic damage that
might result from seabed production. Beginning in the month
immediately before and during the New York spring session, the
United States explored areas of possible compromise with some of
the land-based producer countries and some of the more moderate
members of the Group of 77. Drawing on these and other informal
discussions during the session, the text prepared by Chairman
Paul Engo at the end of the session did propose at least a partial
solution to the land-based producer problem. Engo also made other
important changes in the text which made it more acceptable to the
United States. There were, however, some other features of the
text which the United States has found objectionable.
While the new text provided for a strong central seabed authority, it also adopted the so-called "banking system" proposed by the
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United States at Geneva and rejected there by the Group of 77,
which provided for the equal allocation of prime mining sites, onehalf to the industrialized countries and the other half to the
Authority to be developed by it or "banked" for future exploitation by developing countries. In return, representing a compromise
on the part of the United States, the text also contained a twentyyear production limit tied to the annual growth of the nickel market
to afford protection to developing land-based producers. Although
important issues such as composition and voting of the Council
were not dealt with at the New York spring session, it did appear
as though the issues had been sufficiently narrowed to provide a
basis for real negotiation at the summer session that began in
August.
Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case: the new texts
simply were not acceptable to the Group of 77. Its more radical
spokesmen flatly refused to accept a text that they considered to
be a serious dilution of the "common heritage" concept and one in
creation of which they had not been adequately consulted. As a
result, much of the summer session in New York was taken up with
procedural jockeying with virtually no serious negotiations on any
key points. The Group of 77, through a working group co-chaired
by Sondaal of the Netherlands and Jagota of India, put forward
alternate provisions that, had they been adopted would, in effect,
have returned the texts to their post-Geneva, pre-New York state.
These proposals were unacceptable to most of the industrialized
countries which maintained a largely solid front throughout the
entire session. It must be noted, however, that the main issue on
which the United States and other developed countries have
parted company-the question of a quota system limiting the maximum share of any country in seabed production-was not discussed
at the New York session.
Three weeks prior to the end of the session, Secretary of
State Kissinger attempted to break the log-jam by proposing that if
the developing world would accept the dual access system incorporated in the Revised Single Negotiating Text, the United States
would see to the initial financing of the Enterprise, the proposed
operating arm of the new Authority so that, in theory, it could
compete on an equal basis with the developed world. He also proposed an international review of the entire system at the end of

twenty-five years. While he received a respectful hearing, his proposal, which was not spelled out in detail in any case, simply did not
go far enough to bridge the gap between the developed and developing worlds. With much of the session focusing on the question of
access, on which no progress was made, it is clear that those worlds
still remained too far apart. Given the situation, it almost goes
without saying that questions involving the relative power of the
Assembly and Council, or the composition and voting in the
Council itself, were never addressed at all.
In summary, at the end of the second New York session, the situation was much as it was at the beginning of the Caracas session
two years before. It had become increasingly plain as Paul Engo
himself noted in his report delivered at the end of the New York
summer session that "a number of basic and highly political questions .

.

. have to be answered before any actual drafting of a

compromise text can be undertaken in good faith, and these
questions should be answered at the highest political level."'
REPORT ON COMMITTEE

II

Unlike the informal Single Negotiating Text for Committee I, the
Committee II text that emerged from Geneva did reflect the serious
negotiations that had taken place on many important issues. As
already noted, it already projected the broad shape of what might,
with some further serious work, be expected to form the basis of
the final treaty.
One of the problems that has plagued the negotiations throughout, as much in Committee II as in Committee I, is the following
paradox: while it is much easier to make real progress when negotiating in a relatively small group, the provisions so negotiated tend
to be distrusted, if not totally rejected, by those countries left out
of the negotiations. Without question this factor contributed to the
rejection by the Group of 77 of the "dual access" system proposed
by a small negotiating group during the first New York session in
Committee I. In Committee II during Geneva many of the provisions adopted in the Single Negotiating Text had in fact emerged
from the so-called "Evensen Group" chaired by Jens Evensen of
Norway and limited to selected heads of delegations from approximately forty countries. Countries that had not been included in
those negotiations were critical of many of the Evensen provisions
and largely to still this criticism Andres Aguilar, when he resumed
the chairmanship of Committee II from Galindo Pohl in New York
1. Conf. 62/L16, at 12.

[VOL.

14: 736, 19771

Afterword
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

in the spring, chose to give the entire informal Single Negotiating

Text an article-by-article reading, precisely to give all states a
right to be heard.
In an effort to reduce the number of overall speakers that might
wish to be heard on any issue, the chairman of Committee II enforced the "rule of silence" that had been proposed by the President
of the Conference and adopted by all three committees but only
really followed in Committee II, whereby delegates who failed to
speak up were presumed to be in favor of the Single Negotiating
Text provision then under discussion, or, in the alternative, to be
opposed to suggested amendments to the text unless explicitly
speaking in favor of such amendments.
While this "article-by-article" approach meant that little progress
would be made toward the resolution of major outstanding issues,
it did have the result of clarifying the strength or weakness of
opposing views, throwing into stark relief those issues on which
there was a sharp and important divergence and where further
negotiations clearly would be required. These "priority" issues
identified by Chairman Aguilar at the end of the first New York
session included the juridical status of the waters of the proposed
"exclusive economic zone," access by land-locked states to the sea
and to resources of the economic zone of the region, and definition
of the continental margin including the question of revenue sharing
beyond 200 miles. Of these, at least the first two, juridical status
and land-locked rights, are worthy of particular note: the first because it was the single issue on which the Committee most evenly
split and the second because it generated the most heat.
The question of the juridical status of the waters (and airspace)
of the economic zone has always been one of major importance to
the United States. During the debate on this issue at the first New
York session, some fifty nations spoke in favor of the maritime
states' view that, in spite of resource rights given to the coastal
state, the waters of the economic zone for all other purposes remain
"high seas." Almost an equal number spoke in opposition. Part of
the support for the high seas status of the economic zone, interestingly enough, came from land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states which saw it as in their best interest to side with the
maritime states in limiting coastal state rights in the economic zone
in order to strengthen their own case for a share of the resources
found in the economic zone of their immediate coastal state neighbors.

Indeed, it was over the allocation of resource rights in the
economic zone that the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states, now numbering fifty-one in all, coalesced into one of
the more effective interest groups operating throughout both the
first and second New York sessions. The hardening position of this
group, which led to its assertion of a claim to nonliving as well as
living resources in the economic zone of their coastal state neighbors, had the effect of hardening the position of the coastal state
group, pushing some of the more extreme members back toward
their original conception that, except for rights of navigation and
overflight and the laying of submarine pipeline and cables, the
exclusive economic zone should, in reality, be a territorial sea.
While minor changes in favor of the land-locked states were made
in Articles 57 and 58 of the Single Negotiating Text as a whole,
they were clearly not satisfied with the status of the text at the end
of the first New York session. Thus, both this issue and the
juridical status of the zone remained high on the agenda for the
second New York session.
As the second session began, the key issues, including "straits"
that had been added at the suggestion of the President, were referred initially to open-ended negotiating groups and subsequently
to small groups of states that met at the invitation of the Chairman.
Regardless of the forum, no real progress was made toward the
solution of any of the major outstanding issues dealt with during
the session. The most that can be said is that toward the end of
the session, on the issue of the juridical status of the economic zone,
a proposal by the United Arab Emirates to amend Article 46 dealing
with "rights and duties of other states in the exclusive economic
zone" so as to include "other generally recognized high sea uses
compatible with the principles embodied in the charter of the
United Nations and other rules of international law" to be enjoyed
by "all states whether coastal or land-locked" provided at least a
possible signpost toward eventual resolution of this difficult issue.
It is also true that the "contact group" consisting of a group
of coastal states led by Mexico and land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged states led by Austria did make some progress toward
a compromise that would give the latter preferential rights to living resources in their neighbor's economic zone, not solely to any
surplus that might exist after the coastal state had exhausted its
harvesting capacity, as provided in the Revised Single Negotiating
Text. Other questions, however, including differentiation between
land-locked versus geographically disadvantaged states and distinc-
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tions between the treatment of developing as opposed to developed
land-lockeds remain to be settled.
It should be noted that the second New York session saw little
progress made on Andres Aguilar's other priority issues: definition
of the outer edge of the continental margin and revenue sharing
beyond 200 miles. Both of these await resolution no less than the
other major issues described above.
REPORT ON COMMITTEE

III

Unlike Committee II, Committee III at the New York spring
session made important progress at least in one important area:
the control of vessel-source pollution. Building on the solid work
of the Evensen Group that met during the post-Geneva intersessional period and guided by the Chairman of the working group
on pollution, Vallarta of Mexico, the text as a whole struck what
appears to be an acceptable balance between competing claims: the
need for effective pollution control, and the need to prevent undue
interference with navigation. While the new text generally relies
on international standard setting in the territorial sea and economic
zone, coastal states would be permitted to adopt standards more
stringent than those set internationally to govern vessel discharges
in the territorial sea. Special regulations can also be adopted by
coastal states "for the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution from vessels" in ice-covered areas within the limits of the
economic zone where particularly severe climatic conditions and the
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation....1"2
On the question of enforcement while primary reliance remains
on the flag state, coastal states are given jurisdiction to take administrative measures, initiate proceedings and, in the economic
zone, the right to board and inspect vessels which have not provided
specified information, and where substantial discharges or other important violations of international standards appear to have taken
place. The new text also provides safeguards such as requiring that
vessels be released promptly upon deposit of adequate bond, limiting penalties to those of a monetary nature and establishing a threeyear statute of limitation in criminal proceedings under the articles.
2. Art. 43 A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. I/pt. 3, at 22.

As the summer session began in New York, there was only one
important outstanding pollution question that had not been settled,
at least to United States satisfaction. Would a coastal state be permitted to adopt design, construction, manning and equipment
standards more stringent than those imposed internationally for the
vessels entering its twelve-mile territorial sea? The Committee II
text for the Territorial Sea, expressly prohibited the adoption of
such rules and regulations3 while the Committee III text did permit
the adoption of national laws and regulations provided that they did
"not interrupt or hamper the innocent passage of foreign vessels."4
It is perhaps indicative of the lack of progress achieved by the
second New York session as a whole that even on this one issue,
important to the United States because of its rigorous ports and
waterways legislation already in place, no progress was made.
Turning to the question of marine science, from the perspective
of those favoring freedom of scientific research, a situation that
was already serious enough at the outset of the first New York
session had become even worse by the time the second session had
concluded, last September. As was true in the case of the setting
of design, construction, manning and equipment standards to control vessel-source pollution in the territorial sea, there was an important discontinuity between the Committee II and Committee III
texts on scientific research coming out of Geneva. The Committee
II text provided for coastal state consent for all scientific research
within the economic zone while the Committee III text only required such consent for research "related to resources of the
economic zone or continental shelf." Under the Committee III text,
research of a "fundamental nature" could be undertaken without
consent.
During the first New York session, some of the more nationalistic
coastal states, possibly reflecting a hardening position across the
board in reaction to the new-found coherence among the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, attempted to make
defense considerations an issue by urging that scientific research
be permitted only where it clearly was for peaceful purposes. Perhaps the most surprising development during the session was the
shift in position on the part of the Soviet Union. Toward the end
of the session, in what appeared to be a complete about-face on
3. Art. 20, 2.
4. Art. 2, 3.
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its part, the Soviet Union adopted the Group of 77 position that
would require coastal state consent in the economic zone for all
scientific research with consent, however, not to be withheld if
such research were "for peaceful purposes" and not related to
resources. The text that ultimately emerged, while it dropped the
"peaceful purposes" concept, largely adopted this approach.
At the second New York session, while Committee III for all
practical purposes remained deadlocked on this issue, the drift remained clear. Following the conversion of the Soviet Union to the
cause of a comprehensive consent regime in the economic zone, and
in spite of the forceful reiteration by the United States both in
public and private of the importance it attached to free scientific
research, the United States throughout the second session found
itself increasingly isolated. Only a handful of those countries that
might otherwise have been expected to support free science were
willing to speak out unequivocably on the issue. Significantly,
while Chairman Yankov of Committee III made oblique reference
to the continuing deadlock on the consent issue, in his final report
on the session he proposed a "compromise" that would have the
effect of giving coastal states even greater discretion in granting or
withholding consent than had been provided in the Revised Single
Negotiating Text promulgated at the end of the spring session.
From the United States' point of view it is ironic that, having
initially agreed to a substantial list of obligations to be assumed
by a researching state (advanced notification, the sharing of results, etc.) precisely in order to avoid the need to seek coastal state
consent, the United States now finds itself confronted with a text
that provides both the obligations and coastal state consent.
The outlook at the moment is so discouraging that the only
promising avenue of compromise would appear to be acceptance, in
principle, of coastal state consent while limiting insofar as possible
the criteria on which a coastal state can base its denial. The socalled "tacit consent" provisions of the present text, providing that
failure to respond within a given period can be deemed the
equivalent of consent, would have to be retained if not strengthened. Perhaps even more important, dispute settlement procedures
should be made available to a researching state wishing to challenge
what it believed to be an improper denial of consent for research
within the economic zone. The beginning framework for such a

compromise was in fact formulated by Australia shortly prior to
the end of the second New York session. The extent of researching
states' rights in other states' coastal economic zones, however, may
ultimately depend on the outcome of the Committee ir debate on the
"high seas" status of waters in the economic zone, an issue over
which the Conference as a whole, both for practical and philosophical reasons, remains sharply divided.
REPORT ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Given the nature of the problems that still confront the three
major Conference Committees and over which the Conference is
still seriously split, one might have been tempted to predict that
dispute settlement would have been an early entrant on the Conference casualty list of issues beyond the capacity of the Conference
to resolve. Surprisingly, such has not been the case. While Conference organizers failed initially to accord formal recognition to
dispute settlement as an area of work deserving equal status with
that of the three principal Conference Committees, the task of developing a viable dispute settlement text has nonetheless proceeded
quietly and on its own as a sort of out-rider to the work of the Conference as a whole, sometimes breaking new ground and enjoying
an increasing degree of respectability, status and formal recognition
as the Conference has proceeded. This is all the more remarkable
since there has always been an underlying uncertainty as to the
strength of commitment on the part of a majority of states to any
form of binding dispute settlement that gave an ethereal quality
to the entire debate.
It may be remembered that by the end of the Geneva session,
an informal working group on settlement of disputes in which
representatives from more than sixty countries had participated
from time to time, produced four agreed articles followed by several
annexes embodying fundamentally different approaches to how
disputes might be settled. The first annex (Articles 5-17) proposed
a comprehensive approach and had attached to it sub-annexes dealing with conciliation, arbitration and a Law of the Sea Tribunal.
The second annex, based on a functional approach, referred special
categories of disputes to specialized procedures. A third annex
dealt with information and consultation. The failure of the working
group to agree on anything more than four introductory articles,
reflected both a continuing split over the "choice of forum" question
(should a plaintiff be required to accept the forum chosen by the
defendant at the time of ratification of the Convention-arbitration,
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a Law of the Sea Tribunal or the International Court of Justice?)
and the continued strength of those preferring a functional
approach: binding dispute settlement in only a few specific areas
such as fisheries or scientific research.
After the Geneva session, the President of the Conference on his

own initiative, prepared an informal Single Negotiating Text on dispute settlement, which tried to bridge the gap between the two
positions. The status of this text was in dispute, and some countries asked that the question of dispute settlement be put on the
agenda of the next session of the Conference.
Following the end of the first New York session, during which the
Conference had conducted a six-day plenary session on dispute
settlement that heard statements from some seventy countries, the
President of the Conference was officially authorized to prepare a
new text. This text, accorded the status of an "informal Single
Negotiating Text," contained eighteen principal articles with
annexes dealing with conciliation, arbitration and a draft statute
of the Law of the Sea Tribunal, with a second annex setting forth
a system of special procedures for fisheries, pollution, scientific
research, and navigation. Since signatory powers could choose
their preferred forum at the time of ratification of the convention,
the President, in essence, succeeded in giving something to everybody.
On the encouraging side, during the first New York session, it
was possible to detect a growing acceptance of the over-all concept
of binding settlement of disputes perhaps best exemplified by the
apparent acceptance of the concept on the part of the Soviet Union
at least where fisheries, scientific research, the environment, and
navigation were concerned. Still unsettled, however, was the
major issue of the relationship between the general Law of the Sea
Tribunal provided for in the new text and the special Tribunal
under contemplation in Committee I as an arm of the International
Seabed Authority. "Should there be rights of appeal from one to
the other?" And, "Is there even a need for two separate tribunals?"
were but two of the fundamental outstanding questions that remain
to be answered.
At the second New York session, the President's informal Single
Negotiating Text was subjected to an article-by-article review in

which all major geographical groups, including the Africans in particular, appeared to be fully engaged for the first time. In the
Revised Single Negotiating Text promulgated by the President of
the Conference following the end of the session, as to the "choice
of forum" question the text reflects the growing interest, apparent
during the session, in giving a plaintiff some choice in the matter:
the right to proceed to arbitration rather than acquiesce in the
forum pre-selected by the defendant. There are signs that even
the Soviet Union might find this an acceptable solution.
Thorny problems, however, remain and whether the President
has dealt with them in an acceptable manner is still to be seen.
One of these is the question of access, a two-fold problem involving
both the question of political entities that are not themselves states
(the P.L.O. "problem") and the status of corporations and individuals. The United States is virtually alone in favoring access for
non-governmental entities which the new text does not permit
even where access is sought by individual or corporate owners of
vessels seized by a state party to the treaty in order to seek release
of that vessel.
The solution to most other difficult issues, however, ultimately
depends on the resolution of outstanding issues elsewhere before
the Conference. Thus, while the new text in Article 15 of Annex
II makes general provision for a Seabed Disputes Chamber of the
Tribunal "for dealing with disputes relating to the interpretation
or application of the provisions" of the deep seabed text to be
developed by Committee I, questions of "jurisdiction, powers and
functions of, and access to," the Chamber are left for resolution in
the Committee I text. Equally basic to dispute settlement is resolution of the Committee II debate over the "high seas" status of the
economic zone. Only then are conference participants likely to
agree finally to what extent dispute settlement procedures will
have jurisdiction, as provided to a limited degree by the new text,
over disputes arising from the economic zone on questions involving
living resources or the conduct of scientific research. If the "high
seas" and Committee I questions can be resolved, the major obstacles impeding the development of a widely acceptable dispute
settlement text will have been removed.
REPORT ON STATUS OF THE TEXTS

After the President of the Conference issued his dispute settlement text, there were for the first time Revised Single Negotiating
Texts, in theory of equal status, covering the entire work of the
Conference. How this came about is worth a moment's reflection.
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At the end of the second New York session, Conference leaders

faced a serious problem. The Revised Single Negotiating Text for
Committee I simply was not acceptable to a majority of Conference
participants, nor was it a text that could be fixed by further textual
refinements whether made by the Committee Chairman or, as had
been proposed during the session, by the President of the Conference himself, and as might have been the case for the Committees II
and III texts.
Since further changes in any of the texts would have meant
formal elevation of the status of that text, making it clear that
it would be henceforth even harder to change other articles not
touched in such a revision, the Conference leaders chose, probably
quite wisely, to do nothing. At the end of the second New York
session, each of the Conference Chairmen simply reported on what
negotiations had taken place and gave his personal assessment of
what work remained to be done. Not a word was changed in any
of the Single Negotiating Texts. Since the session had run out of
time, there was little more that the Conference could do for the
moment than, in essence, hold its breath.
On September 17, 1976, the last day of the session, the Conference
at the urging of its President did agree to reassemble in May, 1977.
Its task, as proposed by the President, will be a highly ambitious
one: first to develop an "Informal Single Composite Negotiating
Text" and ultimately a draft convention. Given the lack of
progress at the second New York session, whether the Conference
can achieve this objective must, at best be viewed as highly problematic.
CONCLUSION

During much of the first New York session, the seriousness of
the division over deep-seabed issues in Committee I was temporarily
eclipsed by the flurry of attention given to the question of what
new rights, if any, would be given the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states which spoke out with more firmness and
coherence in New York than at any previous session of the Conference. Some observers even went so far as to say that this was
now the paramount issue to be resolved if the Conference as a
whole were to succeed.

With the second New York session now behind us, it now seems
clear, on reflection, that the preeminence of the "land-locked" issue
was at best temporary. It remains true that the Conference must
make some accommodation with the LL/GDS group just as it must
find a way to resolve the "high seas" status question in the
economic zone. In the last analysis, however, the critical problem
facing the Conference remains, as it has always been in reality, who
shall have access to the deep seabed and under what circumstances?
Where does the solution to the "deep-seabed" problem lie? The
answer, for better or for worse, can probably only be found in the
inner-workings of the chanceries of the world rather than in the
ability of Conference negotiators, no matter how able, to arrive at
new text provisions. Do the countries of the world see a successful outcome of the Conference as in their best interest, and how
high a price in new accommodations are they willing to pay to obtain it? To what extent will developing countries insist on linking
progress on the deep seabed to forward movement on other NorthSouth issues springing from the New Economic Order and the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties? These are largely political
questions and decisions on them must be taken by participating
states at very high levels.
If there is any work to be done between now and the time the
Conference resumes in May, it must involve quiet reflection and
study of all the varying proposals that have been and will be put
forward to facilitate creation of a practical seabed regime, one with
which all important participants can live, even if their theoretical
desires are not fully satisfied. If the political will is there, the
practical solution ultimately will be found.

JOHN TEMPLE SWING
RAPPORTEUR

